

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, MORG, MPOL
SUBJECT: HILEX 8 CRITIQUE MESSAGE
SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS PLAY AT NATO HEADQUARTERS
IN HILEX 8 EXERCISE. PRELIMINARY REACTIONS FROM NATO
DELEGATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF UNDERLINE CONSIDERABLE
SATISFACTION WITH THE LEVEL AND SCOPE OF PLAY AS WELL
AS VIEW THAT HILEX 8 REPRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT
OVER HILEX 7. SPECIAL CREDIT IS DUE THE "ORANGE"
RESPONSE CELL'S SIMULATION OF SOVIET POLITICAL MANEUVERS.
A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS REMAIN OF WHICH HILEX SCHEDULING
AND THE PACE OF MILITARY - POLITICAL INTERACTION REMAIN
THE MOST PERSISTENT. THESE SHORTCOMINGS, HOWEVER, DID
NOT PREVENT ITS BEING A VALUABLE POLITICAL-MILITARY
EXERCISE. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARA 9. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL COMMENT

. WE BELIEVE HILEX 8 WAS A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS --
PARTICULARLY IN COMPARISON WITH THE THINLY VEILED DEBACLE
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TWO YEARS AGO IN HILEX 7 (76 USNATO 2130). MANY OF THE
MAJOR CRITICISMS LEVELED IN 1976 WERE RECTIFIED BY
CREATING:

-- MORE REALISTIC PRESS PLAY

-- DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND

THE DPC

-- MEANINGFUL POLITICAL FREE PLAY IN THE DPC INCLUDING
ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET RESPONSE (ORANGE) CELL.

. IN PARTICULAR THE CREATION OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE
CELL HAD SIGNIFICANT, PERHAPS DEFINITIVE EFFECT IN
CREATING REALISTIC, FAST-MOVING POLITICAL PLAY IN THE
DPC. THIS ENCOURAGED GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY SOME
AMBASSADORS AND THE SYG THAN IN PREVIOUS EXERCISES.

. WE REMAIN SOMEWHAT CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARY
PLAY TENDED TO GET AHEAD OF POLITICAL PLAY. MILITARY
PLAY WAS SPARKED TO A LARGE EXTENT BY PROGRAMMED INTELLI-
GENCE INPUTS AND IT OCCASIONALLY APPEARED AS IF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OVERSTATED THE
CASE FOR MILITARY ACTION TO KEEP UP WITH THE RAPIDLY
EVOLVING SCENARIO. THIS PLACED EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON
NATIONS TO APPROVE ACTIONS WHICH WERE QUESTIONABLE EVEN
UNDER THE EXISTING EXERCISE CIRCUMSTANCES. FOR EXAMPLE,
THE FOLLOWING THREE MEASURES WERE APPROVED BY THE DPC
UNDER INTENSIVE MILITARY PRESSURE BUT MIGHT HAVE BENEFITED
FROM FURTHER REVIEW:

(1) ROE 20 (AUTHORIZATION TO SEARCH SHIPS FOR DESIGNATED
MATERIAL OR CONTRABAND)

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(2) SIMPLE ALERT MEASURE SOZ - (DENYING INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS), AND

(3) REINFORCED ALERT MEASURE ROP - (DEFENSIVE MARITIME
MINING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND WATERWAYS).

. EACH HAS GREAT POTENTIAL FOR INCIDENTS WHICH IN A
PERIOD OF GREAT TENSION COULD PRECIPITATE WAR. NONE IS
"ESSENTIAL" TO NATO'S MILITARY READINESS. POLITICAL
OBJECTIONS TO THESE ACTIONS WERE, HOWEVER, OVERRIDDEN
ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PURPORTED MILITARY NECESSITY. A
CASE CAN BE MADE, HOWEVER, THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN WORSE THAN IT WAS TO JUSTIFY APPROVAL
OF THESE MEASURES.

. SEPARATELY, BUT IN THE SAME VEIN, WE ARE SOMEWHAT
CONCERNED AT THE OVERWHELMINGLY NEGATIVE MILITARY AND
POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE US SUGGESTION TO DELAY AMF
DEPLOYMENT TO TURKISH THRACE AND MOVEMENT NORTH OF THE
NL-UK MARITIME FORCE (STATE 66215). HILEX-8 DISCUSSION IN
THE MC AND DPC SUGGESTED THAT THE AMF WAS A MILITARY
FORCE THAT COULD TIP THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE SOUTHERN

REGION. THE AMF, HOWEVER, IS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT OF MARGINAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, AND MILITARY OPPOSITION TO DPC USE OF THE FORCE AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL SEEMS UNJUSTIFIED. MILITARY OPPOSITION TO ANY DELAYS IN UPGRADING NATO PREPAREDNESS DURING THE EXERCISE, HOWEVER, TOUCHES THE DEEPER PROBLEM OF WHETHER NATO MILITARY PREPARATIONS ASSUME AN INEVITABILITY ONCE THE PROCESS HAS BEGUN. IN EXERCISE, AS WELL AS REALITY, WE SHOULD BE CONFIDENT THE MACHINERY CAN BE STOPPED AS WELL AS

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STARTED (A SIMILAR POINT WAS MADE BY CANADIAN AMBASSADOR HARDY -- USNATO 2820).

. ADDITIONALLY, WE MUST RECALL THAT TIME DURING AN EXERCISE IS ARTIFICIAL IN TWO SENSES. THE INTELLIGENCE SCENARIO UNROLLS AT HIGH SPEED THUS FORCING VERY RAPID POLITICAL-MILITARY RESPONSES. NEVERTHELESS, SOME NATIONAL RESPONSES ARE GIVEN QUITE RAPIDLY BECAUSE THEIR NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE CARTE BLANCHE FOR THE DURATION OF THE EXERCISE. FOR OTHERS IT IS "ONLY A GAME". IN A "REAL WORLD" CRISIS, NO DELEGATION WILL HAVE A FREE HAND AND NATIONAL RESPONSES WILL BE--IF ANYTHING--SLOWER. TO OVERCOME THESE DELAYS, THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT NATO SHOULD REALIZE THAT RUNNING THROUGH THE GAMUT OF ALERT/PREVENTIVE MEASURES IS SECONDARY TO THE REQUIREMENT OF REALISTIC REVIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN APPROVING PROPOSALS.

. SCHEDULING HILEX: TIMING IS A PROBLEM.

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. THE SCHEDULING OF THE HILEX EXERCISE WAS INCONVENIENT. PERHAPS THERE IS NO GOOD TIME TO SCHEDULE A WEEK OF POLITICAL - MILITARY EXERCISES, BUT TIMING THIS YEAR TURNED OUT TO BE EXCEPTIONALLY BAD. SMALLER DELEGATIONS WERE ANGERED BY US, UK, AND FRG INSISTENCE THAT HILEX BE PLAYED AS SCHEDULED, AND IRRITATION PERSISTED THROUGHOUT THE EXERCISE. AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFLICTING DEMANDS DURING "HILEX WEEK", WE NOTE:

-- CCMS PLENARY SESSION 14-15 MARCH

-- PERMREPS LUNCH 14 MARCH

-- NPG "HIGH LEVEL GROUP" MEETING 17 MARCH

-- DRC REVIEWS, MC & EWG LTDP MEETING PREPARATIONS

-- RB/ER MEETING PREPARATIONS

. THESE CONFLICTS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR MANY DELEGATIONS TO FOCUS THEIR ENERGIES ON THE EXERCISE OR TO COMMIT THE MANPOWER REQUIRED TO PLAY EFFECTIVELY (LET ALONE LEARN FROM THE EXERCISE).

. THIS PROBLEM IS ENDEMIC TO HOLDING THE EXERCISE IN MARCH AND THUS THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE SOLUTION IS A CHANGE IN THE EXERCISE DATES. WE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO SCHEDULING HILEX-TYPE EXERCISES IN THE FIRST OR SECOND WEEK OF JUNE. WHILE WE MIGHT IMAGINE THAT THERE WOULD BE CONFLICTS FOR THESE WEEKS, THEY WOULD AT LEAST FALL AT A TIME WHEN:

-- ALL MINISTERIALS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED

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-- NO MAJOR MEETINGS ARE LOOMING

-- MAJOR VISITS TO NATO ARE LESS LIKELY

-- NATO PERSONNEL HAVE NOT BEGUN SUMMER VACATIONS

. WHILE UNANTICIPATED "REAL WORLD" CRISES CAN ALWAYS INTERRUPT "GAMES", AS WAS THE CASE THIS YEAR WITH THE MOLUCCAN TERRORISTS AND THE MORO KIDNAPPING, SCHEDULING IN JUNE WOULD TEND TO LESSEN THE PROBABILITY OF DISTRACTIONS LIKELY TO PREVENT SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CONCENTRATING ON THE EXERCISE.

. WE RECOMMEND RESCHEDULING WINTEX-CIMEX (1979) AND HILEX-9 (1980) TO AN ACCEPTABLE DATE IN JUNE.

3. HILEX PARTICIPATION BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

. POLADS PLAY FOR HILEX 8 WAS FAR SUPERIOR TO PREVIOUS YEARS SINCE THE CRISIS ASSESSMENT GROUP BUFFER BETWEEN POLADS AND THE DPC WAS ELIMINATED AND THEREFORE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS WERE DIRECTLY REPORTED TO THE DPC. THE DPC, HOWEVER, OCCASIONALLY CRITICIZED THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE FOR FAILING TO KEEP POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC "PREVENTIVE MEASURES" ON THE SAME LEVEL WITH MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND COUNTERMEASURES. THIS LAG CAN BE PARTLY EXPLAINED BY RECALLING THAT HILEX 8 WAS GIVEN A "RUNNING START" ON ITS MILITARY SCENARIO BY HILEX 7 (COMPLETED IN 1976) AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE PRE-PROGRAMMED INTELLIGENCE PICTURE FOR MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN HILEX 8 MAY HAVE UNROLLED MORE RAPIDLY

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THAN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ANTICIPATED. MOREOVER,

POLADS WERE ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING "PREVENTIVE MEASURES", SO THERE IS PROBABLY ALSO A NEED TO ENSURE THAT CAPITALS ARE MADE AWARE EARLIER THAT THE PRE-PROGRAMMED MILITARY PICTURE WILL BE SWIFT MOVING.

. THERE WAS ALSO SOME QUESTION BY THE DPC REGARDING THE DAILY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT (PARA 2 USNATO 2772) WHEN ON 16 MARCH IT TOOK STRONG DUTCH REPRESENTATIONS BEFORE THE POLADS BASIC THREAT ASSESSMENT OF 13-15 MARCH WAS CHANGED TO DEVOTE MORE WEIGHT TO THE WP THREAT AGAINST NATO. IN FUTURE SESSIONS POLADS MAY HAVE TO FURTHER ELABORATE ITS REPORTS AND GIVE GREATER ATTENTION TO THE PROGRESSION OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS. DISCUSSION OF "PREVENTIVE MEASURES" (IN CM (77) 65) PROVED CUMBERSOME AND POLADS SHOULD BE ASKED TO RENUMBER THEM CONSECUTIVELY SO THAT EACH MEASURE CAN BE IDENTIFIED IN CABLES AND REFERRED TO BY ONE NUMBER RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, BY "II, A, 1(C)" AS IS REQUIRED BY THE CURRENT LISTING.

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4. SCENARIO ACTION - DEVELOPMENT

. MISSING FROM THIS EXERCISE WAS SIGNIFICANT FEEDBACK ON TACTS WITH WP COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE USSR. WE SUGGEST THE "ORANGE CELL" MIGHT ALSO FEED EAST EUROPEAN INITIATIVES INTO THE EXERCISE AND THAT REPORTS ON HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WITH EAST EUROPEANS BE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE SCENARIO.

. THE SCENARIO ALSO DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE THE RANGE OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES THAT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN DURING A CRISIS. MATERIAL OF THIS NATURE MIGHT BE ORCHESTRATED IN PLACE OF CONTRIVED REGIONAL CRISES PERIPHERAL TO NATO E.G. INDIA, VIETNAM. WE NOTE THAT THERE WAS NO FOLLOWUP TO SUGGESTED "REPRESENTATIONS" PROPOSED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE (PARA 8, USNATO 2708) ALTHOUGH AT LEAST TWO ALLIANCE MEMBERS (BELGIUM AND CANADA) REPORTED RESULTS OF THEIR DEMARCHES.

. FUTURE SCENARIO DRAFTING SHOULD LIMIT THE "CHAFF" FROM OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND DEVOTE MORE ENERGY TO SOPHISTICATED DEVELOPMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN PLAY, AND EVOLUTION OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. TO ENHANCE THE REALISM OF INTERNATIONAL PLAY, US MISSION USUN MIGHT ALSO BE INVITED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE EXERCISE.

5. WASHINGTON PARTICIPATION

. HOPEFULLY, FUTURE EXERCISES WILL INVOLVE HIGHER LEVEL

WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS MORE DIRECTLY. WE NOTE, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT SEVERAL OF THE ALLIES, E.G. NETHERLANDS, UK AND FRG, INVOLVE THEIR CABINETS IN EXERCISE PLAY.

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. THE ALLIES ARE AWARE OF WASHINGTON'S RESTRICTED PARTICIPATION, AND RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT MAY WELL MAKE INDIVIDUAL ALLIES EVEN LESS WILLING TO INCONVENIENCE THEMSELVES FOR EXERCISE PLAY.

6. THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM.

. AS TOUCHED UPON IN THE DPC BY BOTH THE CANADIAN AND DUTCH PERMREPS, HILEX IS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISE EMPHASIZING POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY PLAYERS SEEM TO OPERATE FROM THE PREMISE THAT -- AS FAR AS THE ALERT SYSTEM WAS CONCERNED -- QUALITY OF PLAY WAS CONTINGENT UPON APPROVING THE GREATEST NUMBER OF MEASURES IN THE SHORTEST TIME. AS A POLITICAL, FREE-PLAY EXERCISE, HOWEVER, NATIONAL AUTHORITIES HAVE TO EXAMINE THE DESIRABILITY/NECESSITY OF A GIVEN ALERT MEASURE IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IN THIS CASE, THE ABSENCE OF IMMEDIATE APPROVAL VERY LIKELY MEANS THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT CONCERNING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THAT MEASURE.

. WE NOTE, IN THIS REGARD, THAT THE "RACE" THROUGH SIMPLE AND REINFORCED ALERT PRECLUDED A MORE THOROUGH EXERCISE OF THE MECHANICS OF THE SYSTEM. FOR EXAMPLE SACEUR REQUESTED APPROVAL OF REINFORCED ALERT (SACEUR 161051Z) PRIOR TO DPC APPROVAL OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL REINFORCED ALERT MEASURE. THIS TENDS TO BE DISRUPTIVE BECAUSE ONCE AN MNC HAS JUMPED FROM A REQUEST FOR INDIVIDUAL MEASURES TO A REQUEST FOR THE ENTIRE STATE, NATIONS CANNOT KNOW WHAT HIS PRIORITIES ARE AMONG THE MEASURES. THEREFORE, SINCE THERE IS A REASONABLE

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POSSIBILITY THAT A BLANKET REQUEST WILL NOT BE IMMEDIATELY APPROVED, THE MNC MAY WISH TO CONTINUE TRANSMITTING REQUESTS FOR THE MOST NEEDED INDIVIDUAL MEASURES.

. OUR RUSH INTO REINFORCED ALERT ALSO PREVENTED ANY SIGNIFICANT PLAY OF SIMPLE ALERT IMPLEMENTATION. HAD THE ALERTS REQUEST ENDED SOMEWHERE TOWARD THE MIDDLE OF REINFORCED ALERT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO SHED LIGHT ON PROBLEMS CONCERNING SIMPLE ALERT IMPLEMENTATION. IN FUTURE HILEX EXERCISES, WE RECOMMEND THAT ALERTS PLAY BE SLDW ENOUGH TO ALLOW FOR TRAINING OF PERSONNEL AND ADJUSTMENT OF INTERNAL PROCEDURES. WHAT-EVER "REAL WORLD" OR EXERCISE PROBLEMS RESULT, OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT GENERALIZE THE IMPRESSION AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED IN PARA 1, THAT PERCEPTIONS OF RELATIVE ALLIED WEAKNESS COULD DRIVE US RELENTLESSLY INTO MILITARY STEPS WHICH MIGHT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, E.G., MINING OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS, FORWARD MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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. FURTHERMORE, THE EXERCISE UNDERLINED THE KEY IMPORTANCE OF PROPER MESSAGE ADDRESSES. NUMEROUS SERIOUS MISTAKES WERE MADE IN THE APPROVAL/DECLARATION PROCESS.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, CINCHAN'S EXPRESSION OF DISSATISFACTION WITH THE DPC'S INACTION ON ALERT REQUESTS (CINCHAN 142015Z) WAS PARTICULARLY IRONIC BECAUSE CINCHAN HAD BEEN, DESPITE FREQUENTLY AND EARLY REPRESENTATIONS TO SACLANT REP BY USNATO, CONSTANTLY FAILING TO ADDRESS HIS REQUESTS PROPERLY TO ALL CAPITALS. FOR EXAMPLE, HIS ALERT REQUEST NUMBER ONE WITH A DTG OF 131102Z MARCH WAS NOT RETRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON UNTIL 141348Z MAR, AND THE FIRST PROPERLY ADDRESSED MESSAGE WAS CINCHAN

ALERT REQUEST NUMBER 007, WITH A DTG OF 141328Z MAR.

-- ADDITIONALLY, ON MARCH 15, THE DPC APPROVED THE MNCS' REQUEST TO DECLARE THE FULL STAGE OF SIMPLE ALERT NATO-WIDE SUBJECT TO RESERVATIONS BY ITALY WITH REGARD TO ONE MEASURE AND THE US WITH REGARD TO SIX MEASURES. THE DPC CABLE (NATO BRUSSELS 151938Z MAR) ON THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED THIS INFORMATION PLUS THE FOLLOWING SOMEWHAT CONFUSING STATEMENT, "IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT THESE RESERVATIONS SHOULD NOT HOLD UP FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SIMPLE ALERT IN OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES". BASED ON THIS MESSAGE, ALL THREE MNCS (SEE SACEUR 152042Z, SACLANT 152056Z, AND CINCHAN 152017Z) IMPROPERLY DECLARED THE COMPLETE STAGE OF SIMPLE ALERT WITH NO RESTRICTIONS OR LIMITATIONS. THIS ACTION WAS IMMEDIATELY NOTED BY THE US MISSION DUTY OFFICER WHO CALLED IT TO SACEUREP'S ATTENTION BUT WAS TOLD THAT THE ACTION WAS CORRECT. IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING MORNING WHEN THE US ALERTS COMMITTEE REP WENT TO SEE THE ALERTS COMMITTEE STAFF AND THE MNC REPS THAT THE ERROR WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. TO RECTIFY
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THIS ERROR, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ISSUED A CLARIFYING CABLE (NATO BRUSSELS 161158Z MAR 78), AND THE MNC REPS INDICATED THAT THE MNCS WOULD THEN CORRECT THEIR DECLARATORY CABLES. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT'S CABLE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT ITALY HAD LIFTED ITS RESERVATION AND THE US HAD LIFTED 5 OF ITS 6 RESERVATIONS. HOWEVER, THE MNC'S WERE UNABLE TO GET OUT CABLES PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT THE US LIFTED ITS RESERVATION ON ALERT MEASURE SNA.

-- ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE DPC APPROVED A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL ALERT REQUESTS (SACEUR 152357Z MAR 78, SACLANT 152152Z MAR 78, CINCHAN 152025Z MAR 78, AND CINCHAN 160812Z MAR 78). THE ALERTS COMMITTEE MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT (NATO BRUSSELS 161743Z MAR 78) LISTED THESE FOUR REFERENCES AND THEN READ "THE ALERTS COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE HAS APPROVED THE DECLARATION OF THE FOLLOWING ALERT MEASURES" AND THEN LISTED THE EIGHTEEN ALERT MEASURES CONTAINED IN THESE FOUR MESSAGES, THEREBY IMPLYING THAT THE DPC HAD APPROVED ALL EIGHTEEN MEASURES FOR ALL THREE MNCS. SHAPE'S SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION (SACEUR 16200Z MAR 78) INCLUDED ALL EIGHTEEN MEASURES, SEVEN OF WHICH HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE US AND OTHERS FOR ACE.

-- THESE ERRORS RESULTED FOR THE MOST PART FROM FARR TOO CASUAL HANDLING OF ALERT MATTERS AT NATO HQS. WE BELIEVE WHAT THE ALERTS COMMITTEE MUST DO IS REQUIRE WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION (ON PREPRINTED FORMS OR OTHERWISE) FROM

EACH ALERTS COMMITTEE REP FOR ALL ALERT APPROVALS OTHER
THAN THOSE RECEIVED BY NATO-WIDE MESSAGE, BEFORE SUCH
APPROVALS CAN BE INCORPORATED INTO DPC/ALERT COMMITTEE

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DECISIONS. FURTHERMORE, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE,
WE BELIEVE PROCESSING OF ALL WRITTEN AUTHORIZATIONS,
MESSAGES, ETC, MUST BE DONE ON A CHECK AND DOUBLE-CHECK
BASIS. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THE ALERTS COMMITTEE WOULD BE
WELL ADVISED TO MEET BRIEFLY TO REVIEW ALL OUTGOING
ALERTS COMMITTEE MESSAGES, OR DPC MESSAGES HAVING TO DO
WITH THE ALERTS SYSTEM, PRIOR TO DISPATCH OF MESSAGES.

7. STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS CATEGORIZATION

. THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS IS THE BASIS FOR PEACETIME
PLANNING BY THE MNCS AND REPRESENTS NATIONAL
INTENTIONS -- NOT COMMITMENTS.

. IN A CRISIS, THESE CATEGORIES DO NOT SEEM APPLICABLE
BUT ARE, IN FACT, UTILIZED BY THE UK (E.G. LONDON 141426Z).
WE SEE NO APPARENT DIFFERENCE IN OPERATIONAL TERMS BETWEEN
CATEGORIES I AND III FOR A GIVEN MEASURE. WHEN A NATION
DECLARES ITS FORCES TO BE CATEGORY I, THAT NATION INDICATES
THAT IT INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT A MEASURE IF DECLARED. BY

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DECLARING FORCES AS CATEGORY III, THE NATION INDICATES THAT IT WILL MAKE A DECISION AS TO WHETHER TO IMPLEMENT AT THE TIME OF DECLARATION. IN EITHER CASE, AN IMMEDIATE DECISION IS REQUIRED UPON DECLARATION, AND A NATION WOULD SEEM TO BE MORE OBLIGATED TO IMPLEMENT THE MEASURE BY VIRTUE OF ITS RECENT APPROVAL OF THE MEASURE THAN BY ITS EARLIER CATEGORIZATION IN THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CATEGORY II IS ALSO UNCLEAR TO US. MEASURES SO CATEGORIZED ARE THOSE WHICH A NATION INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT WHEN THE ENTIRE STAGE IS DECLARED RATHER THAN WHEN THE MEASURE ITSELF IS DECLARED INDIVIDUALLY. WHAT THIS SIGNIFIES OPERATIONALLY IS UNCLEAR.

8. TECHNICAL GLITCHES

. (A) TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION.

. STATE 67622 (PRESIDENT CARTER'S MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV) WAS TRANSMITTED NATOWIDE BUT NOT TO USNATO DIRECTLY. FIVE HOURS LATER, AT THE REQUEST OF USNATO, THE GUIDANCE WAS RETRANSMITTED FLASH AS STATE 67643. STATE 67622 WAS RECEIVED DAYS LATER AFTER A USNATO SERVICE REQUEST.

. WHILE IT WAS NOT UNHELPFUL IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE TO HAVE HAD THE INFORMATION TRANSMITTED NATOWIDE, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSION IN WASHINGTON OVER THE FUNCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATOWIDE SYSTEM. OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD PREFER TO RECEIVE OUR GUIDANCE BEFORE IT IS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE.

. (B) SECURE VOICE

. ALTHOUGH READABILITY AND EASE OF ACCESS IMPROVED
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OVER HILEX 7, THERE WERE STILL FREQUENT "OUTAGES" AND INSTANCES OF VERY POOR READABILITY. PRESSURE ON SECURE VOICE FACILITIES WAS HEIGHTENED BY AWARENESS OF COMSEC MONITORING OF COMMUNICATIONS. THUS WHILE SECURE VOICE WAS MARGINALLY ADEQUATE FOR THE LIMITED REQUIREMENTS OF HILEX, WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT IT WOULD PROVE ADEQUATE FOR A FASTER DEVELOPING EXERCISE SUCH AS WINTEX/CIMEX, LET ALONE AN ACTUAL CRISIS SITUATION.

. (C) ALERT SYSTEM COMPUTER PROGRAM

. THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM COMPUTER PROGRAM FAILED TO LIVE

UP TO EXPECTATIONS. THE ALERTS COMMITTEE RECEIVED ONLY A FEW, MOSTLY OUT OF DATE, PRINTOUTS AND ALERTS COMMITTEE REPS HAD TO SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME MANUALLY UPDATING THEIR RECORDS FROM VISUAL SLIDES BECAUSE UP-TO-DATE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.

. FURTHERMORE, AN OUTAGE OF THE ALERTS SYSTEM COMPUTER SYSTEM DURING THE EXERCISE POINTS UP THE NEED FOR A CONTINUALLY UPDATED MANUAL BACKUP SYSTEM FOR USE DURING PERIODS OF COMPUTER OUTAGES. IN ORDER TO PREVENT REDUNDANCY THE BACKUP MIGHT BE MAINTAINED BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECEIVING INPUTS FROM NATIONAL DELEGATIONS AND UPDATING THE COMPUTER PROGRAM.

9. ACTION REQUESTED: AUTHORIZATION TO MAKE COMMENT ON NATO RELATED ITEMS ALONG ABOVE LINES TO THE COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES COMMITTEE POST-EXERCISE DISCUSSION TO BE HELD ON MARCH 31, 1978. BENNETT

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Decaption Note:
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Expiration:
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ISecure: 1
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Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Review Date: 26 may 2005
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Review Transfer Date:
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SAS ID: 3127150
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HILEX 8 CRITIQUE MESSAGE SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS PLAY AT NATO HEADQUARTERS IN HILEX 8 EXERCISE. PRELIMINARY REACTIONS FROM N
TAGS: MORG, MPOL, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/259724b9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
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